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Stability in EMU 
Theo Peters 
 
The public debt and deficit ceilings of the Maastricht Treaty are the subject of recurring 
controversy. First, there is debate about the role and impact of these criteria in the initial phase of 
the introduction of the single currency. Secondly, it must be specified how these will then be 
applied, in a permanent regime, when the single currency is well established. 
On this second point, which is of interest to us here, negotiations led to a "Stability Pact" in the 
autumn of 1996 which established sanctions in the form of unpaid deposits, which could be 
transformed into fines, for countries in excessive deficit. However, countries experiencing 
exceptional events, or facing a severe recession, may be exempted from sanctions. 
The Stability Pact leaves open a certain margin of appreciation in the use of this notion of exceptional 
event. In this regard, the empirical evidence gathered on the different aspects of the problem (magnitude 
of shocks, particularly asymmetric, and their impact on fiscal deficits, state stabilization capacity, spill-
over favorable and unfavorable to take into account lead to advocate vigorously for a flexible application 
of the Stability Pact, considering corrected deficits of the cycle. In the same vein, Pisani-Ferry (1996) and 
Kirrane 1996 propose to favor the debt criterion. 
The empirical analyzes, however, do not take into account the credibility concerns of the Central 
Bank, which seem to have motivated both the definition of the budgetary criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty and their consolidation within the framework of the Stability Pact. In this 
perspective, it is proposed here to illustrate from a simple model the underlying dilemma of the 
European debate between monetary credibility and regional stabilization. The model only 
schematically captures two characteristics of the European Monetary Union: the choice of an 
independent European central bank as a means of solving problems of monetary credibility; a 
strong supposed capacity for regional stabilization of demand shocks by the Member States, 
which is considered necessary in view of the potential magnitude of these shocks (Kirrane 1993). 
The aim is not to develop a particularly original model, but on the contrary to show, in a 
standard and simple macroeconomic framework, that this dilemma between credibility and 
stabilization is truly delicate in EMU (which explains a certain the passion of the debates on this 
subject), and then to assess to what extent relatively automatic sanctions, such as those envisaged 
in the Stability Pact, can provide a solution. First of all, we recall the different theses in making 
use of the stabilizers presence model adapts both the model components (first of us will serve 
Rogoff part) policy-mix, from (1985), Then reference. In monetary terms, this one clarifies the 
budget and budgetary coordination, it is possible that the authorities are interested in limiting the 
amount of money to a controlled equation. a (second context where union inflation part). It is 
supposed to show such a central dilemma that credibility and stabilization has been achieved that 
to isolate it the independence of the pressures appears, from the daily, bank even and the 
solutions to make it perfectly possible to this credible one. The dilemma, then, and then discusses 
the automatic interest of a mechanism-type Pact of relatively stable sanctions (third part). 
The observation of the existing federations does not unfortunately make it possible to specify the point of 
balance between these two theses: the associated risks are documented to a freedom by the excessive 
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budgetary experience; but this is not sufficient to justify criteria such as those adopted in the Maastricht 
Treaty, (Kirrane 1996)  which some federations do not necessarily answer and which, when they have 
concerns, do not have monetary credibility put forward in the European context. Finally, Buiter's 
complexity (1993) proposals of the problem illustrate: brutal, budgetary constraint is essential; however, 
the criteria of the Treaty do not really have a theoretical meaning; but they are not harmful if they are 
applied sensibly as was the case in Ireland. 
This two questions last appreciation about the recent Pact leads naturally to stability. To a too 
strict application of it would it make stability necessary the establishment of instruments of 
federal nature Masson (1 of 996) stabilization? Up to what point did the application of the 
stability suggest that Criteria of the Treaty to the Pact sanctions should be automatic? 
The formulation of the Stability Pact, considering exceptions to the application of sanctions, is a 
compromise. This one basically translates the state of Maastricht, of the debate on which the criteria the 
budgetary elements commonly of the Treaty admitted can schematically be summarized by the risks some 
of monetization minimum proposals of the following public debts (see Kirrane 1996), the excessive 
ones cannot be ignored; but the stabilizing role of the states is also a key element of the single European 
fiscal multiplier, is the maximum idea that the context has been a strong argument to show that the 
disadvantages of monetary union were this limited role of stabilization with regard to can its benefits 
affect that; however, the short term and does not substitute for greater market flexibility to absorb shocks 
in supply standards; Lastly, there are good holdings on the average term rules, public management, the 
figure of 3% of deficit seeming however too high in average cycle, but likely to be exceeded in case of 
major shock.  
To answer this, it is necessary to look more systematically at the arguments in favor of the Pact 
to identify the resulting stability of five: the default: prevent and budget risk Wyplosz 
inflationary of a state-to-member ensure "the internalisation neutralize pressures "inflationary 
effects on rates; uncoordinated fiscal policies; correct the political bias towards excessive 
deficits; to encourage the coordination of policy-mix imbalanced budgetary policies, and 
monetary policies combining a lax fiscal policy and monetary policy excessively seems to them 
to be the first, strict. The argument that the pressure that the most serious situation would weigh 
on the monetary authorities and the risk of contagion to be taken into account are real. They 
observe, however, on the one hand that the need to reinforce the prescriptions already contained 
in the Treaty should, where the being is justified risk of contagion; On the other hand, through 
the channel of the banking system, the effective reduction response would be a reinforcement of 
the flexibility of it, at the disposal and not one of the substantial ones within that remain, that 
framework, as nuances it is found in national budgetary authorities. 
The architecture of the Stability Pac compromise reflects the opposition between those who 
favor the Artis arguments dismiss bias as "political" as the two applying the need to strictly 
consolidate these criteria for no lease spread out, while domesticated, this is not obvious - the 
impact; and monetary union externalities between risk of default of a public finances Member 
State's resulting from the effects of spill-over state-member, and guarantee the others against the 
threat of fiscal policies, the result of which is to have such an in fine approach to bear it, restricts 
and those excessively who fear judged them on the ambiguous. This role of the Pact of stability 
leads as means to strengthen the strategic leadership of the European Central Bank in the 
development of economic policy in the European area, in the absence of "common culture of 
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stability". The idea that the Stability Pact has meaning only in relation to the articulation, or 
potential conflict, between monetary authorities and budgetary authorities is therefore well 
established. 
Artis and Winkler envision this strategic interaction at two different horizons. The long-term aspect 
corresponds to the elements mentioned above concerning the intertemporal budget constraints and the 
risks of monetization of excessive debts. In this perspective, various works (Beetsma and Bovemberg 
1995, Kirrane 1996) show, from a theoretical point of view, the possibility of excessive public debts in 
monetary union. But this argument justifies the debt criteria contained in the Treaty more than the 
strengthening of the deficit criteria associated with the Stability Pact. 
This leads them to draw attention, in addition to this long-term argument, to possible conflicts in 
the elaboration of the policy -mix, recalling the episodes of imbalance of this one, in the United 
States at the beginning of the eighties, and during German reunification. On this point, however, 
their analysis does not explicitly take into account the specificity of the European Union, 
characterized by the bursting of fiscal policy between "N" Member States. 
Short-term credibility and policy-mix considers the central issue of developing a policy-mix 
appropriate to the economic situation of the Union, between a single central bank and 
decentralized fiscal policies. He is afraid of a particularly dangerous prisoner's dilemma, which 
would permanently result in an overly restrictive monetary policy. 
In this perspective, he considers that the Stability Pact is a set of rules that can be useful for 
"reassuring" the Central Bank, signaling the commitment of member countries to respect a 
certain budgetary discipline. On the other hand, he considers that the sanctions mechanism is 
dogmatic and excessive, and lacks credibility. 
The analysis that is developed below is precisely at this point of the analysis, since it is first of all 
a matter of formalizing this potential conflict "1 -N", then of seeing to what extent can 
rehabilitate the Stability Pact as a whole. 
It is based on the theory of Rogoff (1985). This approach has its limits since these models are not 
really dynamic. In they do not include particular, the accumulation of debt, while debt and 
inflation problems are strongly linked. It has nonetheless partial of its verifications retained, 
despite empirical, moreover because it has exerted undeniable influence on the architecture and 
in particular of the institutions statutes of the Central European Union Monetary Bank, here is 
not the relevance .Our goal is this general architecture, but rather to see, in playing assuming the 
accepted Pact of the principles stability, in the elaboration role that can policy-mix between an 
independent central bank and N autonomous budget authorities . 
We consider a closed economy, whose equilibrium is determined described in terms of the 
relative rates of unemployment at the reference level of the economy. Its short-term equilibrium 
satisfies a standard IS-LM model (see Mute, 1992, chapter VI on Noting the dilemma y, p, g, 
inflation-unemployment, m deviations (in% by example). 'activity, currency and r price 
difference expenditure on public rates, interest, the offer it is written: 
(IS) y = kg-sr + ud 
(LM) m = y + p - br-um 
with k, b, s, positive parameters and ud, um representing shocks on the demand for goods and on 
that of the currency. 
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Insofar as the dynamics of equilibrium capital accumulation are not of interest in the following, 
this results from the interest-rate relationship: 
we can summarize this / TO (IS-LM) TA / IA y A = b + s g A b + sb + s 
We also consider a global supply curve that translates from Phillips. Interpretation The Friedman 
activity gap is therefore based on the curve of the difference between the prices and the 
anticipated prices: 
y = e (p-pe) 
This model makes it possible to apprehend the stabilization of the shocks on the global demand 
summarized by IS-LM. On the other hand, one did not introduce shock in the equation as 
possible of supply, the problem of stabilization way to simplify to solve. 
In closed economy it can be perfectly solved as will indeed below the political balance to the 
optimal inflation bias while responding perfectly in this case to avoid higher the socially optimal 
rate of unemployment, and the employment objective of demand shocks. Focusing on private 
agents different from that of the government. shocks the role of demand, stabilization one places 
oneself authorities in the budgetary field where national disputed in general, EMU but is also 
better - it has to be recognized remember - and not k> 0 in commitment the case where by the 
superiority compared to apolitical policy discretionary is the strongest. 
It should be noted that it is assumed that the monetary authorities are seeking to stabilize the 
economy and not just prices. Indeed, as long as one of the expected production presupposes the 
expectations ye is zero rational, given the deviation of the global supply curve. By reporting in 
IS-LM, it comes then: supposes that the authorities (see third part) monetary are credible, there is 
no reason to introduce budgetary authorities. a divergence The alternative objective solution with 
them would be to assume that the Central Bank has no commitment capacity and that the 
problem of pe = - g + m credibility is solved indirectly, by essentially assigning it a goal of 
inflation. For simplification of the notations in the following, we renormalize the different sizes 
by posing: we equivalents, interesting because here, both the two approaches only consider that 
demand shocks, there does not really conflict s = -gy bk a = s + e (b se + s) -y a, u _sum - + ~bu 
Indeed, by bringing the activity back to its long-term level, (y = 0) the macro-economic 
authorities inflation at its level bring back desired. Also the interest in this case of privileging the 
first approach is to emphasize that of model this satisfies way, the equilibrium two following 
macro-economic equations: of the problem of coordination between monetary monetary 
authorities which will and will be developed budgetary authorities ci- The bottom line results in 
Union 
(l) y = M-Me + u 
not only possible constraints or limitations on monetary policy, which would be a (2) p = Me + 
cy c> 0 
priori too "conservative". with M = m + g 
Optimal equilibrium equilibrium is interpreted as activity, as one of the price spreads, and at M 
resumes the aggregate policy mix, combining monetary policy m g. and The equation (1), the 
fiscal policy, in which the variable associated with the variable u is assumed to have a mean of 
zero, reflects the idea that only unanticipated policies have an impact on activity, with an 
inflationary effect described. by 2). 
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Insofar as the value of interest rates is not included in the objective function, and their action is 
considered solely through the policy-mix channel of demand, aggregate, the two-component 
substitutable. The analysis stabilization rules can be conducted initially at the level of aggregate 
policy mix. Rogoff's analysis is simplified it has been shown, moreover, how this model derives 
from a usual macroeconomic model, in which, moreover, since only demand shocks have been 
considered. 
Wages are rigid in the short term and fixed according to the anticipated policy-mix Me = me + 
ge. In this context, the long-term activity cannot be modified. If one admits that the makers of the 
policy-mix contrast one observes the capacity of stabilization shocks u, they keep activity in. To 
analyze the conditions, it will be supposed that the budgetary and monetary public authorities 
react have the same after function the observation of loss, of shocks, in which and that the all 
will apply first, if the simple authorities can rule M engage, --u that stabilizes the activity at its 
equilibrium level, without inflation, which minimizes rule the monetary expectation of M loss = 
Me + (3). S (u) If, between its component decomposition, the anticipated Me and its counter-
cyclical stabilizing component S {u), of zero mean, the expectation of loss L is indeed: target 
price level is that of reference /? = 0, but where by a curve the level of supply of activity (upper 
ye = 0) would be judged the desirable one determined LZE ((S (u) + u in the ideal. The 
coefficient k characterizes this deviation, which on the translated, market by example, work, 
making the existence of the rate of unemployment distortions In the absence of commitment, 
appears an inflationary bias. Indeed, having observed u, the authorities would solve: - - = 0 
either: dM (4) because u))) 2 + ^ {M - uk) 2 
The application of the rational expectations hypothesis to equation (4) then implies the 
inflationary bias: (5) Me = bk / c 
This bias is systematic and much higher than the nominal rigidities are strong. 
By referring to (4), we deduce M = bk / cu. In this simple model, therefore, there is always a 
complete stabilization of activity, but the lack of commitment from the authorities would 
therefore cost on average - {bk / c) 2. Ex ante the authorities have an interest in not trying to 
reach a level of activity higher than that determined by the supply curve, because this can only 
result in inflation. However, if they can not credibly commit to this rule, they will tend to do it ex 
post trying to take "by surprise" the agents, which they anticipate, hence the inefficiency noted. 
To overcome this problem of credibility, to focus the monetary authorities on price stability, a 
goal U = - |) 2 would be an effective solution here. In this case the authorities would indeed 
solve, - ^ - = 0 = Me + c (M - Me + u) where Me = 0 if the dM agents are rational, and finally M 
= -u. 
It should be noted, however, that this solution is satisfactory only because it does not take into 
account supply shocks. In this case, the monetary authorities' focus on inflation would only 
partially replace a credible commitment to a rule. While this solution does away with the 
inflationary bias, it leads to an insufficient stabilization of activity. Thus, the solution devised by 
Rogoff (1985) to solve the problem of temporal incoherence consists in appointing a 
"conservative" central bank governor, that is, giving greater weight to the fight against inflation 
than society, thereby reducing inflation expectations during wage bargaining. However, the 
weight given to inflation should not be infinite, as the reduction of the inflationary bias increases 
the variability of unemployment in the event of a supply shock. 
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The two components of the policy-mix are now distinguished by their "turnaround time" and 
their commitment capacity. In this respect, the extreme assumption is that the independent status 
of the Central Bank (ECB) allows it to commit to a rule, and that, on the other hand, the 
budgetary authorities have no capacity to commitment. In addition, it is assumed that the 
monetary authorities have a stronger responsiveness, which leads to the following diagram, in 
four steps: 
12 3 4 Commitment Observation of m Choice of g Application of m ECB by the authorities 
satisfying the on a rule monetary and rule laid down in budget step 1 
By resolving by recurrence upstream, we observe that if the monetary rule is of the form m (u), 
the budgetary policy defined in step 3 can impose its point of view in step 4 since m and g are 
substitutable. In other words equation (4), with inflationary bias will prevail ex post. This can be 
countered in two ways. 
First, a strict g-0 budget standard can be envisaged, which is cost-neutral given the perfect 
substitutability of the two components of the policy mix. With the assumptions adopted the 
monetary authorities are therefore sufficient to ensure complete stabilization, taking as a rule m = 
-u, on which it was supposed, by hypothesis, that they could engage. 
The alternative is to incorporate a monetary policy response into the monetary rule, which is 
decided before monetary policy m is applied at Step 4, and therefore known to the monetary 
authorities at the time when monetary policy apply their rule. The monetary authorities can 
therefore discipline fiscal policy by threatening them with a restrictive policy, annihilating the 
effect of fiscal policy, if it is too expansionary. In particular, optimal stabilization can be 
obtained if the rule announced is: (6) m - ug 
In this particular case, the central bank's focus on price stability would also be a solution since it 
would lead to the ex post application of rule (6). But it was pointed out that this was linked to the 
absence of supply shocks. 
The essential point is that in such a framework, remain otherwise valid, but there are fiscal rules 
such as those of the Treaty of European Union central problem being shown the unnecessary 
introduction of a the central bank having the capacity of adapted engagement applies: if the rule 
that the central bank has fixed itself "plays (6), last", it is not and place to consider the two terms 
of the policy -mix, since it is basically the monetary authorities that determine it. This explains 
that the usual models only one global market, which is written ml + m2 = m. 
After taking into account the hypothesis of rational expectations, such a model leads to policy-
mix a summary form by reducing the "local" equations that M. satisfies (1) 'to consider and the 
(2)'. model However, the proposed ones are written : the authorities developed in monetary the 
lineage of Rogoff control directly assume that inflation and that one does not detail the two 
components of the policy-mix. The problem is then to know in what conditions the independent 
central banks can have the desired commitment capacity (on this point, see for example the 
debate between Alesina-Gatti, 1995, Fischer, 1995, and McCallum, 1995). Of course, this 
question applies to the future European Central Bank. But what seems interesting to us to show 
is that the monetary coordination is between authorities in budgetary conditions and 
completely different in monetary union. If one assumes the hypothesis of significant asymmetric 
shocks, the preceding analysis is in fact substantially disposable of the modified ideal BCE, in 
EMU, setting itself even a goal if one economic, and having the capacity to s to engage perfectly 
on a rule. 
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To show it, we consider the two-country model (ï = 1, 2) following, extending the previous one: 
and u. = u ± ua, 
This type of specification corresponds to the reduced form of a monetary union where the 
monetary policy in a model and the combined rate of interest apply again to the union, three 
curves IS, LM, and Phillips' relations to Friedman. The shape: The IS curves to be considered are 
then of The interest rate is indeed unique. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account the 
complementarities of imports in activity (a) and the competitiveness effect on foreign trade (e). 
The demands of the aggregate level on the monetary union as a whole, we thus find the model 
studied previously. At the local level, it is more complex because, a priori, the fiscal policy 
carried out by one country influences the activity and the price expectations in the other. This 
influence passes through three channels: the trade, the interest rate, and the labor supply weight 
that depends on the relative price of these different consumption mechanisms anticipated. The 
transmission of fiscal policies from one country to another is controversial. 
Insofar as it is not this aspect of the coefficient problem that we are not definitely interested here, 
and where the established, sign of us, we retain the most neutral hypothesis a = 0. In other words, 
the additional hypothesis that is made of externality here on direct the coefficients (with offer of 
is money that it gives) does not have the budgetary policy of one country on the other, the effects 
of transmission by the imports and competitiveness offset exactly the crowding out by 
discounting interest rates. 
Here the debates the interest on the magnitude of this relative hypothesis of these is different 
terms, and the associated problems of coordination (see Mute (1995) for a synthesis on this 
subject co-ordination): does monetary policy lead, lack of policies too or not enough expansive? 
This puts us in a position where the fiscal autonomy of the states is the best justified. 
The dilemma between monetary credibility and the stabilization of asymmetric shocks in EMU It 
is assumed that the national fiscal authorities have, as before, a traditional loss function: and that 
the central bank minimizes the expectation of - (L j + L2). In other words, we do not introduce 
divergence a priori in the objectives pursued, except that the central bank does not consider that 
the activity is natural aggregated, taking into account that in instruments that symmetrical model 
of which it has. 
In having this framework in each member state the optimal stabilization would be the policy mix 
latter. We then find, as before, applying the hypothesis of expectations M i = - u ± ua, the 
monetary authorities taking charge for example of common shocks, and the budgetary authorities 
In this case, the national governments would have asymmetric shocks . in each state, at the level 
of the natural unemployment rate. But this policy can not be put in place as simply monetary 
authorities imposing that in the case of the previous choice, a rule ex ante non-inflationary 
discipline of the authorities to consider budget. What would happen to understand it, with the 
different ones it is enough rules to which the ECB can think. 
rational to equation (4) 'g. = bk - ± ua. The bias of the budgetary authorities is identical to that 
calculated previously. This results from the assumption that effective fiscal policies stabilize 
national asymmetric shocks perfectly and that there is no direct externality between countries. 
The problem of reintroduction as it would require this element would also make it difficult to 
consider the problems of efficiency or inefficiency of coordination mentioned above. 
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State budget policies, a rule of the type m = - u - A, (g1 + g2), is a priori non-model, restrictive, 
and because this ensures the perfectly symmetrical policy stabilization -mix overall shocks in 
each symmetric country is written "common". then under with X - 0, the national policies thus 
stabilize the inflationary asymmetric shocks, and thus one but loss 2 with on average a bias the 
form: M ^ -u + Gt (gngj) with Gi (gi, gj) = ( lX) gi-Xgj, which therefore represents each of the 
policy-mix states, resulting local account resulting, from the rule to the monetary level of in got 
this to the case, level the result of only one is country, so with similar M = - u. To one that 
certain central way does not serve the independence to nothing since of budgetary the authorities 
impose in fact the inflationary policy-mix that one just wanted to avoid and of any choice (gitgj), 
after stabilization of the common shocks. 
While the inflationary bias can be corrected as previously by the monetary policy rule, the Nash 
equilibrium of the game of budget policies at the penultimate stage then satisfies, if it exists, the 
conditions: by taking for example X = 1 The national budgetary authorities no longer have any 
impact on the activity of encouraging their country bias, which is inflationary. What removes But 
then this also removes, as a result, the possibility for the States driving on average to stabilize on 
the L and L shocks to an asymmetric, loss equal to h (-k2 + si). 2 s considering that: 
The analysis of this system leads to consider three extreme cases: X = 0; At, = 1 and À, = 1/2. 
The first corresponds to an ECB which, in principle, does not seek to thwart possible overly 
expansionary fiscal policies. The second corresponds to the polar inverse political case in which 
it is aggregated with overcompensation and the third corresponds to a strict compensation. 
Suppose first that X = 0, ie that the monetary rule does not seek to discipline the budgetary 
authorities and is defined independently. 
Contrary to the hypotheses of the economy of the closed model, avoid where it is biased to 
inflationary demand shocks, while it is no longer perfectly matched in EMU, and it is then 
necessary to choose between responding in order to adequately eliminate the inflationary bias to 
asymmetric policy shocks and budgetary. It should be noted that in case of deviation of one of 
the penalties a very budgetary authority, strong to all such a rule of the Union, implies all 
countries paying indeed as if they had deviated themselves. Under these conditions, its 
implementation would be very demanding in terms of credibility. In acceptable, the context as it 
returns the EMU to deny it to states does not appear any stabilization role. 
The case X = 1/2 is also interesting because it seems the natural transposition of the rule (6), 
effective in the unique, model and whose one of base has seen where also the authority that 
would prevail budget with is problems monetary authorities with no commitment capacity but 
focused on inflation, stabilizing - (p {+ p2). However, there is no equilibrium in local opposites, 
case, because a what would be rule in imposes desirable policy-mix but is incompatible with the 
inflationary bias resulting from (4 ') refer to the credibility monetary reflection. On Persson and 
Tabellini can therefore be effective that European (1996) shows for a current in different 
particular analysis more devices are accurate than badly the institutional, adapted institutions 
conditions to the resolution type pact of situation. Stability of the problems to between this 
respect, hazard the proponents of the moral debate of associates about sanctions to this Finally, 
for the other values of X each country can realize its desired Gt defined by (4 '), because the 
system Gt (gitgj) is invertible. We thus find the results obtained for X = 0. The monetary policy 
the whole introduces from the Union a "paying" externality for between the country excessive 
deficits of a Member State. But everyone has an interest in developing policies that are too 
expansionary. 
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Thus, without a complementary instrument, there appears to be a dilemma between the two polar 
solutions: stabilizing regional shocks (k = 0) and avoiding the inflationary bias (k = 1) automatic 
and those who advocate a pragmatic approach, disagreement credibility-stabilization presumably 
on the case also by terms cases, an appreciation to consider, to translate, different arbitration 
certainly, but a to the possibility of gathering relevant information - the second ; This approach, 
transposing Walsh's (1995) reflections on the consistency of monetary policy, consists of 
equipping the fiscal authorities with national fiscal authorities to better account for the 
inflationary consequences of their choices, given that the threat of a restrictive monetary policy 
tends to dilute on all the equation countries (4) 'members. For this purpose, it is sufficient that in 
the case of accountability the one causing the difference of the cost between the two solutions is 
equal - (bk / c) 2 - - = - s \. If shocks inflationary bias(-bk). The imposition of sanctions leading 
to the transformation of the cost function L., So that the national authorities minimize 
asymmetric are relatively low compared to the severe shocks (ie inflationary, = 0) appear 
preferable rules. In the opposite case, a strong budgetary autonomy is desirable. This simple 
model therefore provides a good illustration of the terms of the controversy of being EMU, then 
developed from the point of view of stability budgetary criteria - = p2 + - ~ (yi ~ k) 1 + bkgi, 
would thus make it possible to reconcile the credibility of monetary decentralized way,: if the 
stabilization sanctions are well and dimensioned to play this role incentive an automatic 
mechanism of the type of stability pact a thus, there appears to be a substitute (and effective, not 
one, and is a cause of potentially needed) for federal mechanisms. This implies in this context 
possible solutions. 
Technically, two types of solutions make it possible to get out of the previous dilemma: - a 
"cooperative" determination of budgetary policies, ensuring the maximization of the collective 
function L. In this case, the discipline of the monetary rule with X = 1/2 regains its policy-mix 
efficiency since the inflationary Union will be without any bias. It assures then, that it analyzes 
to penalize the deficits but also to reward, to note that the automaticity in a similar way, of the 
mechanism surpluses. This is important because it guarantees the credibility of the sanctions and 
therefore their incentive character: if the sanction is not likely to occur, and there is no 
cooperation of the national budgetary authorities, we find the previous behavior, characterized by 
an inflationary bias appears possible to achieve g. ± ua, which ensures the institutionally 
stabilization of this may correspond regional shocks. either at one to the co-operation 
establishment budget of mechanisms of the Member States, transfers or type of mechanism gap 
federal, intrinsic federal without not capacities borrowing.  
In Monetary Union, the dilemma between anti-inflation credibility and stabilization of asymmetric shocks 
can discipline is effectively tricky because through bank inflationary central does budgetary authorities. 
Indeed the monetary policy constitutes in a certain way a public good, interest to opposite to behave of 
which in passenger the clandestine authorities, national each country trying to favor the activity at home, 
knowing that it will apply the monetary policy the restrictive whole of the Union (Kirrane 1994). This 
will result in the model considered, which therefore puts forward not the budgetary externalities of the 
intrinsic Member States but between the political ones resulting from the place of the uniqueness of the 
mechanisms of the policy such as monetary, those envisaged the setting in the Pact stability can then 
constitute a solution in empowering reintroduce policies of budget incentives national, if the sanctions are 
perceived as relatively automatic. 
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It should be noted that this analysis is based on strong assumptions: strict association between 
the independence of the central "La Rogoff Bank"; effectiveness and problems of stabilizing 
credibility in the fiscal face of asymmetric shocks; polar characterization and reaction two 
components of the policy-mix engagement capabilities; not taking into account the problems of 
budgetary cooperation does not concern the Member States. transitional phase By the way it 
passes to the single currency. Finally, it only validates the principle of a relatively automatic 
penalty mechanism, not the adequacy of the actual framework of the Covenant.  
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